Sunday, 23 February 2014

18…17…18? New Developments in the Legal Battle over Same-Sex Marriage


By John Noland

On December 20, 2013, advocates for marriage equality won a victory in the last place they would have expected.  Robert J. Shelby, a District Court Judge in Utah, one of the most conservative states in America, struck down a state constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.  This was not to be a decision to be taken lightly, especially in a state traditionally so opposed to the extension of marriage to same-sex couples.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has stayed the ruling until the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, based in Denver, can hear and rule on this case, Kitchen v. Herbert.  Then, just four days later, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the federal government would recognize the marriages that had been performed after Shelby’s decision, in spite of the continued appeal process.  This twisty, convoluted judicial process by which the Utah ruling’s status is debated is in many ways emblematic of marriage equality’s rise in America, with its blend of judicial action, federal and local lawmaking and unmaking, and passionate activism on both sides of the issue.  Similarly, the ruling in Bishop v. Oklahoma recently called into question the legality of same-sex marriage in that state.  With the upcoming appeal in mind, this could prove to be a massive decision for the Supreme Court to have to make.  The only certainty in such instances is of contention.
In 2005, Utah voters approved “Amendment Three,” which declared that “marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman” (Kitchen, 8).  This was largely in line with the state’s general pattern of disproval of this issue.  In a 2010 poll, only 27 percent of residents believed that same-sex marriage should be legalized (Utah).  This analysis also found that 70 percent of respondents identified as Mormons, 50 percent as Republican, and 52 percent as somewhat to very conservative.  Much of the surprise and outrage that this decision engendered was rooted in the solid conservatism of this state.  For some, this reflects judicial activism, and the court’s tendency to go beyond its purview to rule on political, and not merely legal questions.  That the court would go against Utah’s demonstrated inclinations on this issue shocked many.  Indeed, Michael Ferguson, newly wed under Shelby’s ruling, admitted that he and his husband were “still cognizant of the fact that this still is one of the most conservative states in the union,” and that an appeal was unsurprising (Healy and Liptak).  Proponents of the verdict, on the other hand, would argue that it is the court’s duty to decide issues that the political system has no rule in weighing, like civil rights.  This is largely the view that Judge Shelby took in his extensive opinion.
The guiding principle Shelby used to justify the nullification of the amendment was primarily based not in federalism, but in constitutionality.  When the Supreme Court ruled on this issue in United States v. Windsor in 2013, they “explicitly avoided ruling on whether a state ban on same-sex marriage was valid” (Denniston, 12/21).  The question of federalism in this debate, or in whether states have the right to declare such marriages unconstitutional, was of secondary concern for Shelby.  Though he “agrees with Utah that regulation of marriage has traditionally been the province of the states,” he nonetheless provides the caveat that state regulations “must comply with the Constitution of the United States,” and thus contends that the issue is “not who should define marriage, but…of whether Utah’s current definition of marriage is permissible under the Constitution” (Kitchen 1).  This is arguably a philosophically weightier issue, as questions of jurisdiction, like those the federalism debate considers, imply a measure of legality.  They are questions of who should be in charge, rather than if there should be anyone in charge at all.  Thus, by making this a discussion of constitution, Shelby cast doubt over the argument that bans on marriage equality could be made at all.  After weighing these distinctions, Shelby “holds that Utah’s prohibition on same-sex marriage conflicts with the United States Constitution’s guarantees of equal protection and due process under the law,” and thus such an amendment serves to “deny its gay and lesbian citizens their fundamental right to marry and, in so doing, demean the dignity of these same-sex couples for no rational reason” (Kitchen 2).  In order to back up this assertion, Shelby’s opinion discusses the nature of state jurisdiction over interpersonal relations, and the history of the marriage equality movement.  In his analysis of the Windsor decision, he writes that the Supreme Court “grounded its holding in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which protects an individual’s right to liberty,” a right that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) denied by making same-sex marriages less respected or valued than others, and in thus demeaning the couples (Kitchen 12).  However, Shelby also identified precedent useful in regards to the plaintiff’s claim that the Utah law violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  “[T]he Supreme Court has considered analogous questions that involve the tension between [state’s rights to regulate marriages and individual’s rights to equal protection and due process] in other cases,” he writes, offering Loving v. Virginia’s ruling on miscegenation as an example, before concluding that the Court “has held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that individual rights take precedence over states’ rights where these two interests are in conflict” (Kitchen 13).  Herein lies the centerpiece to Shelby’s nullification of Utah’s amendment. Though the state has a right to regulate marriages, this is secondary to the individual’s primary right to due process and equality under the laws.  Constitutionality, or the lack thereof in this case, precedes federalism, in the question of personal rights.
            As is standard for such hotly-contested issues, this decision was promptly appealed.  As the geographical overseer for this region, Justice Sotomayor moved the request for a stay to the full Supreme Court, which affirmed it unanimously, and thus pushed the case to the relevant appeals court, the Tenth Circuit.  Yale law professor William N. Eskeridge, Jr. does not believe that the stay should be taken as a sign of the court’s action or inaction to come.  “We know nothing more than we did the day after” the Supreme Court ruled in Windsor, he declared (Healy and Liptak).  In the meantime before the appellate is set to rule, the question of the status of those who were married in the period before the Supreme Court’s decision arose.  From December 20 to January 6, “some 1,360 marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples across the state” (Denniston 1/10).  However, on January 10, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that, “for purposes of federal law, these marriages will be recognized as lawful and considered eligible for all relevant federal benefits on the same terms as other same-sex marriages” (Denniston 1/10).  This reflects the power that the federal government has in providing benefits to same-sex couples, regardless of state opinion.  It is important to note that these individuals must be recognized by state authorities as married, though this marks a continuance of the trend seen in the federal government now offering joint tax returns to same-sex couples married outside of their home state.  Indeed, for advocates of marriage equality, the federal government could be a powerful ally in extending rights to all couples.
            As the Tenth Circuit prepared to hear the appeal of Kitchen v. Herbert, a similar case arose within the appellate court’s jurisdiction.  In Bishop v. Oklahoma, Judge Terence C. Kern ruled that the state’s limiting of marriage to heterosexual couples is “an arbitrary, irrational exclusion of just one class of Oklahoma citizens from a governmental benefit,” words that mirror Shelby’s opinion in Utah (Eckholm).  This decision is also quite significant in that it comes from another strongly conservative state, marking a path by which proponents of marriage equality may seek reform in traditionally red states.  Kern denied same-sex couples in Oklahoma the same opportunity that those in Utah had, as he “stayed his decision in anticipation of an appeal by Oklahoma to the same appeals court where the Utah case is being heard, the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit” (Eckholm).  However, as the Utah case has been expedited, the two may not be argued in conjunction, though the Circuit Court might also seek to use this as an opportunity to address both at once.  Indeed, in any of the numerous permutations by which these cases could be litigated or decided, it is highly likely that the Supreme Court will need to address this issue again.  This is especially true in the case of a circuit split, in which two Courts of Appeals might pass contradictory rulings, leaving the Supreme Court the task of rectifying the two.
            Same-sex marriage remains one of the most divisive issues in America.  As Judge Shelby writes, “[s]ince 2003, every other state has either legalized same-sex marriage or, like Utah, passed a constitutional amendment or other legislation to prohibit same-sex unions” (Kitchen, 9).  In situations like these, middle ground is hard to come by.  There are currently seventeen states that recognize marriage equality, with Utah having been the eighteenth for a short time.  As some point, the Supreme Court will likely have to offer a more definitive ruling on the constitutionality of these state bans on same-sex marriage.  Until that day, there will likely be many more cases like Kitchen v. Herbert and Bishop v. Oklahoma, for as long as people have grievances will there be courts to air them in, and that these two cases come from conservative states only serves to illustrate the rapid growth and uncertainty in the way this issue might be concluded.



References

Denniston, Lyle. "U.S. Will Recognize Utah Same-sex Marriages (UPDATED)." SCOTUSblog. SCOTUSblog.com, 10 Jan. 2014. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

Denniston, Lyle. "Utah’s Same-sex Marriage Ban Falls (FURTHER UPDATED)." SCOTUSblog. SCOTUSblog.com, 21 Dec. 2013. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

Eckholm, Erik. "Oklahoma’s Ban on Gay Marriage Is Unconstitutional, Judge Rules." The New York Times. The New York Times Company, 14 Jan. 2014. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

Healy, Jack, and Adam Liptak. "Justices’ Halt to Gay Marriage Leaves Utah Couples in Limbo." The New York Times. The New York Times Company, 6 Jan. 2014. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

Kitchen v. Herbert. United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division. 20 Dec. 2013. N.p., n.d. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

Utah Opposes Same-sex Marriage, but Not All Recognition. Public Policy Polling. Public Policy Polling, 21 July 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

Implications of Salinas v. Texas


By Caitlin Barbas

The case of Salinas v. Texas has increased attention and controversy in regards to the rights of individuals within the United States justice system after being argued in the United States Supreme Court. The Fifth Amendment became an integral part of what would have otherwise been a standard state murder trial, after prosecutors introduced Genoveno Salinas's silence when asked an incriminating question[1] during a police questioning prior to arrest, as evidence. Salinas had answered all other questions during the interview, however, refused to answer only that specific question.
After the Texas State Court of Appeals and the State Court of Criminal Appeals ruled against Salinas, the case was brought to the United States Supreme Court. Salinas argued that his silence prior to arrest was an invocation of the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights and, therefore, should not have been used by prosecutors as a means of demonstrating his guilt[2]. The Fifth Amendment protects from self-incrimination, stating, “[no person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”[3]
            In the opinion of the court, written by Justice Samuel Alito and joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Kennedy, the rulings of the Texas State Courts were upheld. Using the cases of Quinn v. United States and Minnesota v. Murphy as the basis for the decision, the court explained that as Salinas did not explicitly state that he was utilizing his Fifth Amendment rights, he could not expect his decision to remain silence to be protected under this amendment.[4]  The court further stated that due to the nature of the voluntary police interrogation, Salinas’s silence would not be acceptable as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment. By agreeing to speak with the police, Salinas’s case fell “outside the scope of Miranda and other cases in which [the court has] held that various forms of governmental coercion prevented defendants from voluntarily invoking the privilege.” [5]
            Following the decision of this case, it is possible that this instance of a lack of clarity between the interviewer and the interviewee may occur in future investigations. Thus, one must question how explicitly an interviewee will need to state their decision to invoke their protection against self-incrimination. Must this protection be specifically cited as the Fifth Amendment or would an explanation instead be acceptable? Furthermore, how must the timing of the invocation occur relative to the questioning? Richard Albert explains how the explicitness needed when stating the use of the silence during white collar investigation could create misinterpretation. Albert states that, provided a company has a predetermined procedure in the case of white collar investigation, “if the witness decides to follow company procedure only when the questioning approaches a sensitive area, it would seem that Salinas would give a prosecutor the option to later argue that the termination of the questioning at that particular point is an indication of guilt.” [6]
            Overall, while the case of Salina v. Texas, as well as previous cases dealing with the Fifth Amendment and admissibility of silence in court, establishes that an interviewee must clearly state an invocation of the Fifth Amendment, there remains a lack of clarity as to how and when this invocation must occur.



[1] Lane Powell Attorneys and Counselors. "Salinas v. Texas: How ." Accessed November 11, 2013. http://www.lanepowell.com/16881/salinas-v-texas-how-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-a-murder-case-impacts-the-issue-of-remaining-silent-in-corporate-white-collar-investigations/.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Cornell University Law School. "Fifth Amendment." Accessed November 12, 2013. http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fifth_amendment.
[4] Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 186 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2013) [2013 BL 158572]
[5]Ibid.
[6] Albert, Richard F. "The Supreme Court's Decision In Salinas v. Texas: Implications For White Collar Investigations." Forbes . Accessed November 11, 2013. http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/06/19/the-supreme-courts-decision-in-salinas-v-texas-implications-for-white-collar-investigations/.

By Victoria Vail

Every student interested in law school has a unique story about why they aspire to be lawyers one day.  Whether we never forgot about Atticus, watched a movie with a lawyer as a hero, have always been that kid who loved the Constitution or have more tangible inspirations, there are many influences that affect ones decision to pursue Law School.  More often than not, lawyers inspire us within our families.  In my case, my uncle has been a source of inspiration in my pursuit of a degree in Law.  He has lived in Alexandria, VA and worked in D.C. as Vice President of the Center for Constitutional Litigation throughout high school.  After taking a college road trip, I finally landed in D.C. where I was told my uncle that I should definitely take a look at The George Washington University.  It was on my list, but after hearing his consent I knew I should take it into deep consideration.  He taught a seminar in Public Interest Lawyering at the GW Law School from July, 1998 – December, 2001. 
              My uncle’s story can be taken back to times when my father recalls him reading books upon books while other kids his age were running around the neighborhood in their New Jersey town.  He had always been a thinker the one of the family who was destined to attend college.  In 1976, he graduated from the University of Chicago.  Three years later, he graduated with a JD from the School of Law at Vanderbilt University.  He was then a Trial Attorney for the National Labor Relations Board where he investigated and litigated unfair labor practice cases and drafted decisions.  He then worked his way up at Legal Services of Upper East Tennessee and eventually became a Litigation Director there.  From October 1984 until April 1988, he worked at the Center for Defense of Human Rights in Budapest, Hungary.  He was later a Staff Attorney at the Center for Law and Education where he dealt regularly with the United States Congress, the Department of Education, and the White House.  He also worked to restructure high schools in order to improve student learning. Then he was the Senior Counsel and Associate Director for Constitutional Litigation for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America where he focused on the right of access to courts and the right to trial by jury. 
            After representing victims of terrorism with Fay & Kaplan from 2002 until October 2013, he has decided to create his own firm named John Vail Law.  He plans to continue working with Fay & Kaplan to continue securing justice for service members and their survivors who were victims of terrorist bombings at Khobar Towers and a Berlin discotechque. He has remained passionate throughout his entire law career and has created bonds with numerous organizations promoting the rights of the citizen under law.  I admire his representation of low-income families when he worked as lawyer in Tennessee and around the rest of the country.  He has also argued nearly twenty cases at the Supreme Court level.  His interest in Europe and desire to expand his business there is also something that appeals to me.  When I continue to pursue my dreams of becoming a lawyer one day, I am proud to say that I have John Vail as my uncle to look up to.


Works Cited:

"John’s Resume." John Vail Law PLLC. http://johnvaillaw.com/johns-resume/ (accessed November 11, 2013).