By Ryan Niksa
It is always difficult and disturbing to hear about allegations of abuse of power, corruption, and other serious criminal activity occurring in systems where individuals are appointed to protect and serve others. Recently, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the principal authority of the United Nations charged with maintaining international peace and security, adopted a resolution that addressed escalating allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed by UN peacekeepers in multiple regions. While the resolution agreed to by fourteen of the fifteen member states of the UNSC ostensibly represents growing effort and progress for current Secretary-General (SG) Ban Ki-moon in breaking a culture of institutional failure and impunity deep inside the UN, some remain skeptical. Seeing how such abuse has long been significantly underreported and inadequately handled, there appears to be an inexplicable lack of effort from UN leadership and the UNSC.
For over sixty years, UN peacekeepers have been deployed in field missions into war-ravaged and impoverished countries around the world to protect civilians and maintain order. According to a recent UN report, as of late February, there are sixteen active UN peacekeeping missions and just over 122,000 total peacekeeping personnel, with military peacekeepers representing a majority of the total personnel (over 104,000 of the 122,000 plus members are military troops, police, and observers). Over 120 UN member states contribute to the UN military peacekeeping personnel, and of the sixteen field missions, nine currently operate in Africa, more than any other region, specifically in Darfur, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and other unstable areas. In regions as poor and chaotic as the DRC, Darfur, and CAR, UN peacekeepers are the main security force. The current peacekeeping mission in CAR, MINUSCA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic), created in 2014 after fighting erupted the year before between the Muslim Séléka and Christian anti-Balaka groups, has close to 10,000 military peacekeepers from over two dozen contributing member states.
Sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeepers is certainly not a new problem. Ban Ki-moon’s predecessor, Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General from 1997-2006, was the first SG to directly address the problem. He created a “no tolerance policy against sexual abuse and exploitation” in 2003, explaining that “men, women and children displaced by conflict or other disasters are among the most vulnerable people on earth. They look to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for shelter and protection. Anyone employed by or affiliated with the United Nations who breaks that sacred trust must be held accountable and, when the circumstances so warrant, prosecuted."
In 2004, Annan invited Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the UN, to be his Adviser on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, and in 2005, the two collaborated to produce the first comprehensive analysis of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel. Commonly referred to as “The Zeid Report,” the assessment designated four main areas of reform: the current rules on standards of conduct, the investigative process, organizational, managerial and command responsibility, and individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability. Since Ban Ki-moon replaced Annan in October of 2006, he has keenly reaffirmed commitment to the no tolerance policy. Furthermore, the SG has discussed the institution of deeper reforms with member states of the UNSC. Such proposals include increased education and training for peacekeepers on what constitutes sexual exploitation and abuse under the no tolerance policy, more immediate reporting of any allegations against volunteer and military peacekeeping personnel, and harsher sanctions against member states that provide corrupt peacekeepers. Since 2007, the UN has overhauled its justice system and established an entirely new Conduct and Discipline Unit, and training, investigative and victim assistance procedures have been developed through a “three-pronged” strategy of prevention, enforcement and remedial action.
The main hindrances to commitment to the no tolerance policy most worryingly reflect flaws in the inherent structure of the United Nations. Peacekeeping missions are at historically high levels of deployment, with contemporary missions lasting almost three times longer than missions a decade ago. Such high demand for UN peacekeepers but stagnant numbers of UN peacekeeping volunteers translates to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) constantly looking to member states for funds and personnel. Dependency on states impedes oversight and accountability, as through current agreements between the UNDPKO and troop-contributing countries (TCCs), the peacekeeping troops’ home country is the sole investigator and prosecutor of any alleged abuse committed by them, rendering any disciplinary action from the TCC completely voluntary. Investigations by the national investigation organizations (NIOs) of TCCs are usually delayed, allowing for evidence or witness tampering, the accused are shuffled around and hidden from the UN and human rights non governmental organizations (NGOs), and outcomes related to the investigation’s progress or any disciplinary action from the TCC are usually unclear or unreported. Other issues stemming from the lack of UN oversight persist: allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are still underreported, and without proper training, peacekeepers remain confused about the perceptions of sexual exploitation and continue to engage in prostitution and transactional sex (food and rations to the peacekeeper’s beneficiaries in exchange for sex) at elevated rates. Besides a lack of deterrent training and education, remedial assistance to victims is still very weak: very few victims have been assisted due to lack of dedicated funding and the slow enforcement process.
The UNSC was finally impelled to act after a startling escalation in sexual exploitation and abuse allegations was recently uncovered in the Central African Republic, igniting a scandal that rocked the United Nations. According to a report from the UN General Assembly in February, of the 69 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeepers in 2015, 38 came from just two peacekeeping missions: MINUSCA, and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The SEA allegations against MINUSCA peacekeepers in 2015, however, received significant attention and elicited harsh criticism against the UN and its response to allegations. The scandal precipitated by SEA allegations made in CAR in mid-2014 that remained undisclosed until March of 2015 engendered further condemnation.
In May and June of 2014, an official from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) conducted interviews with ten children from Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic. The children alleged that between December 2013 and June 2014, soldiers from the French Sangaris Forces and Chadian and Equatorial Guinean troops forced them to perform sex acts in exchange for food or money. A month after the interviews, a report describing the allegations was sent to a high-ranking OHCHR director of field operations, Anders Kompass. Kompass would inform his boss of the findings, before giving the report, which included the names of the victims and perpetrators, to French diplomats in Geneva. His release of the report to the French would spawn a cover-up rather than responsive action. OHCHR leadership suspended Kompass, and not until late March of 2015, a full eight months after Mr. Kompass’ actions, did the United Nations send an official copy of its Bangui inquiry to the government of France, with all the names redacted. Ban Ki-moon, outraged with the concealment while hearing more allegations specifically incriminating UN peacekeepers in CAR, forced Babacar Gaye, the head of the MINUSCA mission, to resign in August of 2015. By January, twenty-two allegations had been brought against UN peacekeepers in CAR, even after an external inquiry launched by Ban Ki-moon prompted the release of a scathing report that extensively cited “gross institutional failures” in the MINUSCA scandal.
On March 11th, the UNSC responded by adopting resolution 2272, a sweeping resolution that introduced multiple reforms to address the rise in sexual exploitation and abuse allegations. The resolution’s first clause heeded recent advice from Ban Ki-moon “to repatriate a particular military unit or formed police unit of a contingent when there is credible evidence of widespread or systematic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit.” The second clause further requested that the Secretary-General repatriate all units of the TCC or police-contributing country from which the alleged perpetrator was from if they fail to take the appropriate steps to investigate the allegation, inform the SG of the investigation’s progress and outcome, and/or hold the perpetrators accountable for their actions. The concluding section recommended improvements to SEA pre-deployment training, established a trust fund for long-term counseling and medical support for victims, and underscored the critical importance that internally displaced persons and refugees are protected from any form of exploitation or abuse. Shortly after the passage of resolution 2272, the UN, for the first time, began naming the countries of alleged perpetrators. Ban Ki-moon vowed to make information available about outstanding allegations on a new website, partnering with important human rights NGOs including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to do so.
While resolutions created by the UN General Assembly are not legally binding, resolutions adopted by the UNSC are. However, as much as resolution 2272 is a permanent step in the right direction in ending the culture of impunity and corruption, critics like myself instantly ruminate on what else needs to occur for better implementation of the no tolerance policy. If the UN and its peacekeeping missions are to regain the trust of our planet’s most vulnerable civilians, can repatriation, resolution 2272’s salient reform, benefit them? The notion of repatriating troops after discovering evidence of abuse sounds noble in principle, but what if nations still need the UN peacekeeping troops as their main security force, simply because their withdrawal would plunge the country back into instability? The Central African Republic, even as a hotbed of sexual offenses and allegations, has limited options. United Nations officials in February contended that CAR was particularly fragile amidst crucial presidential elections, and repatriating a battalion accused of committing sexual abuses could lead to even greater problems, since it has always been logistically difficult to bring in a new battalion of military peacekeepers. Ban Ki-moon and the UNSC alike voice the need for further reforms, but while further reforms should supplement those of resolution 2272, they should not fixate on UN peacekeepers from specific countries. The ensuing wave of reforms should be directed at the United Nations’ core structure and how it currently fails to hold UN and member state officials accountable.
Anthony Banbury, former United Nations assistant secretary general for field support, would know about the UN’s structural problems from working for the organization for over three decades. In his recent editorial piece in The New York Times, Banbury, in divulging his reasons for recently leaving the UN, cited the peacekeeping atrocities in CAR, and mentioned the UN’s stunning lack of accountability, where “short of a serious crime, it is virtually impossible to fire someone in the United Nations. In the past six years, I am not aware of a single international field staff member’s being fired, or even sanctioned, for poor performance.” The current problems holding UN peacekeepers accountable certainly relate to the UN’s dependency on a disproportionate group of troop-contributing countries, but this only provides more incentive to undergo structural changes instead of simply relying on the reforms of member states. If it is difficult to replace corrupt peacekeeping troops with fresh troops, then the UN should take an alternative route to enforcing accountability: removing the chiefs of staff in peacekeeping missions if they are not appropriately managing their peacekeepers, just as Ban Ki-moon removed Babacar Gaye from MINUSCA.
The UN should also look outward in directly addressing its structural issues and improving accountability. Human rights NGOs including AIDS-Free World and Human Rights Watch should not only report allegations online as enumerated in resolution 2272, but also be tasked with reviewing the performance of UN supervisors and troop leaders and reporting back to the OHCHR field director. These organizations would not be overstretched since not every region has rampant SEA allegations and offenses that require their intervention. A more effective proposal might involve the formation of a completely independent commission, called for by UN member states and assigned with looking into every allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse by both military and civilian peacekeeping personnel and all other supervisory staff running peacekeeping missions around the world. Besides resolution 2272’s “name and shame policy,” the UN must accomplish much more in expediting prosecutions and weakening the culture of impunity and recidivism, and a DNA database of all peacekeepers, created and regularly monitored and updated by the OHCHR, would be an impactful deterrent.
My final proposed change might be perceived as the most radical, but Ban Ki-moon himself proposed increased utilization of on-site martial court investigations and trials. I believe the UN should begin experimenting more liberally with such proceedings. According to the aforementioned UN General Assembly report released in February, the average time taken in 2015 to appoint national investigation officers or inform the Secretariat of a national investigation was three weeks. With on-site martial court proceedings, the investigation would be much quicker and more thorough. Witnesses and perpetrators would still be in the mission area, and the UN and OHCHR, through holding effective investigations and legitimate martial proceedings, can successfully prevent the alleged perpetrators from returning to their home countries outside of UN jurisdiction. Due to the UN’s bureaucracy and limited resources, it is unrealistic to assume that the UN can usurp the role of sole investigator and prosecutor for all sexual exploitation and abuse allegations, but transferring power from the TCCs back to the UN would certainly exhibit a paradigm shift in UN structure and accountability. Moreover, on-site martial proceedings could become a viable method against SEA allegations in the future.
While the disillusionment and lack of faith in the UN’s credibility is almost palpable in his editorial, Banbury states at the article’s conclusion that “Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is a man of great integrity, and the United Nations is filled with smart, brave and selfless people … but we need a United Nations led by people for whom ‘doing the right thing’ is normal and expected.” I, like Banbury, still deeply respect the personal sacrifices made by those who work for the UN, and for all they do to make the world healthier, more equitable, and more secure. The UN’s most pressing problems, its lack of accountability and transparency, bureaucratic inefficiency, red tape, and antiquated structure and mentality, have certainly led to many losing faith in the organization’s ability to promote international cooperation and peace.
However, I believe the MINUSCA peacekeeping scandal not only made UN leadership more aware of its peacekeeping problems, but also opened their eyes to key structural issues, providing an impetus to change and take necessary action. With more planned peacekeeping reforms on the horizon, I am interested to see what direction the UN takes. If UN leadership is serious about resolving the issue, it must address structural problems within the organization, especially pertaining to how it holds member states and individuals accountable. If the UN can make genuine progress on a structural level, it would certainly strengthen my faith in its legitimacy. More importantly, internal reform would go a long way in improving implementation of the no tolerance policy, restoring trust and helping to ensure that only the best peacekeepers provide assistance and security to those who need it most.
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