Sunday 23 February 2014

The TPP: For whom is the Law Made?

By Andrew Costello


On November 13th, 2013 the USTR, the Obama Administration, and international negotiators were humiliated by a shocking revelation; yet, few have heard about it. The leak of the secret Trans-Pacific Partnership’s (TPP) IP Chapter by WikiLeaks and the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen has elicited little response. That is not to say that the leak did not garner some coverage by the press, the Post, US News, and Al Jazeera all wrote about the release; however, there was neither an openly public response by the government nor any serious accusations by public figures. Nonetheless, it is surprising to note the lack of attention paid to the leak, which shows the USTR pushing for the implementation of a stringent patent regime among other clauses that patent plants and animals. The degree of apathy with which I find people receiving this news is alarming; even worse, it may signal that those party to the negotiations are, in actuality, succeeding in their goal of keeping secret a trade pact that could affect hundreds of millions of lives.
The TPP, when originally conceived in 2005, was a small-scale free trade agreement (FTA) between Brunei, New Zealand, Chile and Singapore that included reasonable and equitable changes to each country’s trade laws and regulations, along with an eventual elimination of tariffs by 2015. However, when it grew to include far larger and more developed economies such as the US, Canada, and Australia, the TPP began to transform into what it is known as today. While the conditions of equitable concessions from each member remained the same, the goals of each player changed dramatically, as the developed economies wanted to protect what they already had, usually in direct competition with those who needed such discoveries to progress. The TPP has become a tool for the US’s foreign policy initiative under its “Pivot to Asia” ushered in by the Obama administration to counter a rising China. The goal of the policy change is to foster stronger ties, economically in the case of the TPP, with South East Asian countries; however, America’s goals for the TPP go one step further. In a region that the US generally views as soft on the IP protection, the enforcement of American IP standards through the use of the TPP is exactly the sort of remedy sought by the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
At its essence, “free trade” ought to provide equal economic ground through equal economic concessions by removing all barriers; however, it is difficult to encounter such an arrangement in actuality, if there were, the TPP would be its antithesis. The stated goals of the USTR in negotiating the TPP are to increase American exports while supporting American jobs, leading Asia-Pacific regional integration, and increasing American competiveness in the Asia-Pacific Region. Unfortunately, this would retard the growth of less-developed signatories, stifle innovation abroad, and, in the end, only benefit a select few within the wealthier nations party to the negotiations. All-encompassing and immensely restrictive, the treaty would hamper developing economies more than help them, merely binding them to America’s agenda, both politically and economically.
 On has only to take a cursory glance over the clauses stipulated by the USTR in the TPP’s IP chapter to begin to grasp its potential consequences. Through a series of patent-extension clauses, the US proposals in the TPP provide an agreement that has the potential to keep drug prices out of reach from the poorer people. One patent-adjustment clause stipulates that a patent owner “shall adjust the term of a patent to compensate for unreasonable delays… in the granting of the patent” (The TPP, Article QQ.E.XX). Moreover, any such extensions of the patent’s term would include “all of the exclusive rights of a patent… that would otherwise apply… absent any adjustment” (The TPP, Article QQ.E.XX). While it has been argued by the government and other institutions that patent extension clauses provide “financial incentives to develop new medicines” and their absence would “undoubtedly reduce the number of new drugs developed,” the credibility of these arguments falters when applied to the TPP (Manhattan Institute, Medical Progress Report).
Furthermore, the TPP includes clauses that aim to prohibit producers of biosimilars, generic drugs, from obtaining the costly clinical data, greatly damaging local innovation in developing countries. The IP chapter of the TPP states that a party looking to bring to market a pharmaceutical cannot use “the safety or efficacy information previously submitted” for marketing approval (The TPP, Article QQ.E.16). What this means for generics companies, which far less funding, trying to develop a competing product is that they must undertake timely and costly trials for the FDA despite the fact that such trials have already been performed. Furthermore, the assertion that extending patent periods in an effort to increase the profits of blockbuster drugs is questioned by many, including a study by the Kellogg School of Management which discusses “The Innovation Gap in Pharmaceutical Drug Discovery” in recent years in spite of the record profits being had. 
It is true that studies, including some mentioned in this post, have proven that patent extensions incentivize the production of new drugs; however, this has been proven only in wealthier nations such as the US or Canada. In industrialized countries the higher price and monopoly periods for blockbuster drugs are seen as a “transfer from drug payers to drug patent holders to support R&D” (NIH, Effect of Pharmaceutical Patent Term Length). Indeed, many would perceive these clauses as fair because they allow innovators to recoup profit that they lost to the exigencies of the bureaucratic process that can be used for new drug development; rather, the extension clauses, when applied to such a disparate group such as the TPP signatories, can have disastrous effects.  First, the aforementioned “transfer” from drug payers to patent holders is financially destructive, if not impossible, for the average citizen in Vietnam or even Peru, two signatories of the TPP. Perhaps the most devastating consequence of the patent term adjustment clauses, coupled with data exclusivity clauses, is the damage to the production of affordable, generic medicines. The extension of a company’s monopoly over a pharmaceutical and the concealment that drug’s manufacturing process, causes consumers to suffer from a lack of competition while local innovators suffer from an absence of information.
To impose strict, corporate-friendly patent regimes upon countries that are still undergoing growing pains, like Vietnam, is to exacerbate existing inequalities and mire those nations in years of struggle due to prohibitively priced medicines. Although Vietnam’s healthcare system has steadily improved its resources since privatization beginning in 1986, these resources have not spread equally, as the “main beneficiaries of commercialization continue to be affluent social groups” (Marriot, Global Health Check, 2011). If you are lucky to be included in the 60% of Vietnamese who have health insurance, you will have to use drugs that, while covered by insurance, are “at least 30% over the market price” (Marriot, Global Health Check, 2011). This differential is particularly a blow to the poor, who comprise the 35 million uninsured in Vietnam, and live overwhelmingly in rural areas, half of which have no clean water and often little access to medicines. Thus, to introduce the provisions stipulated in the TPP would be disastrous for those 35 million Vietnamese who are already having a tough time; moreover, the country would be unable to introduce or develop generics to alleviate the problem. It is clear that no immediate good and, perhaps, no eventual good can be had from forcing the TPP on the Vietnamese people, or others like them, in its current form.
Free trade and the treaties which aim to espouse it should benefit all parties involved and not impose restrictive rules on its adherents, not liberalize trade. The reality of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is that, like the vast majority of the treaties that preceded it, it is not a set of clause that embody free trade; rather, the agreement is a collection of laws that benefits once set of people within one or more countries. The clauses that allow for patent term extension and data exclusivity were not designed with the intention of spreading wealth between countries or classes, but to increase the wealth already held by a small amount of companies and individuals: the innovators, the patent-holders. Written under the guise of equality, these potential laws are exclusionary in their nature, and their results would be devastating to the burgeoning Pacific economic zone. It is with this thought in mind that those negotiating the TPP should return to their debates and ask each other plainly, for whom is the law made?



















Bibliography

             Hu, Michael, Karl Schultz, Jack Sheu, and Daniel Tschopp. The Innovation Gap in Pharmaceutical Drug Discovery & New Models for R&D Success. Publication. Evanston: n.p., 2007. Print.
Grootendorst, Paul, and Livio Di Matteo. "The Effect of Pharmaceutical Patent Term Length on Research and Development and Drug Expenditures in Canada." PMC. NCBI, 3 Feb. 1007. Web. 2 Dec. 2013.

Lichtenberg, Frank R., and Gautier Duflos. The Effect of Patent Expiration on U.S. Drug Prices, Marketing, and Utilization by the Public. Rep. New York: n.p., 2009. Print.

Marriott, Anna. "Vietnam’s Healthcare System Suffers on Policy Failure." Global Health Check RSS. Global Health Check, 24 Oct. 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2013.
The TPP. US/AU Proposal. QQ.E. Location: 2013

Kilic, Burcu. "What's New in the Wikileaks Text?" Citizen.org. Public Citizen, 13 Nov. 2013. Web. 15 Nov. 2013.

New York City Surveillance Program and Individual Freedoms

By Caitlin Barbas


The Constitution of the United States protects a person and their possessions from unjust search and seizure by the government and law-enforcement officers; however, does this protection of privacy extend to American citizens in the case of surveillance and telecommunications monitoring as well? As multiple organizations come under scrutiny for their surveillance practices, the dividing line between an individual’s privacy rights and the government’s intelligence gathering rights becomes blurred.
            The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is still facing strong criticism following an Associated Press (AP) investigation in 2011 which revealed high levels of surveillance upon American Muslims and Islamic Organizations both in and around New York City.[1] Due to the high volume of Muslim organizations and individuals monitored by the NYPD following the September 11 attacks, many have argued that these intelligence gathering efforts are ethnically and religiously driven and thus violate the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights.
            As the issue of privacy rights grows, the application of laws, as well as the new interpretation of these laws in regards to technological innovation becomes a key issue. We will look into the case study of the New York City Police Department’s surveillance policy, briefly explained above, in order to further analyze the changes in legislation and policy following the September 11 attacks and the introduction of new multi-media technology. This paper will begin by providing a brief description of the actions of the New York Police department in their surveillance, examining the legal changes which allowed for the increase in surveillance by the NYPD, and analyzing the reaction to the surveillance policies and the legal possibilities of the cases against the city and police department.
            The New York Police Department greatly increased the scope of their intelligence collecting unit following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The creation of the Demographics Unit with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped to expand the investigations of the New York Police Department.[2] The information gathered by the Demographics Unit often led to further investigations by undercover detectives and agents of the NYPD. Muslim Student Associations, ethnic community centers, and Muslim mosques were the most commonly monitored areas, through means of recordings, undercover operations, and social media discussion, as a result of the definition of Locations of Concern.[3] The release of the New York City and Newark, New Jersey police department’s joint investigation revealed the criteria of Locations of Concern. These include high crime areas but also, a “center of activity for a particular ethnic group, location that persons of concern may be attracted to, location that individuals may frequent to search for ethnic companionship, [and] a popular hangout or meeting location… for listening to neighborhood gossip.[4] The Muslim Student Associations, monitored by police both on campus, who reportedly gained cooperation of university security by explaining the police were conducting a gang and drug-ring infiltration[5] and through the student associations websites, included the MSA at Buffalo, NYU, Rutgers, Albany, Columbia, Stony Brook, LaGuardia Community College, Brooklyn College, the University of Pennsylvania, Queens College, Baruch College, Clarkson University, and SUNY Potsdam.[6] Throughout these surveillance investigations, the NYPD found no leads into terrorist plots and organizations.[7]
            The surveillance and intelligence gathering carried out by the New York Police Department was made possible by the reduction of laws limiting the extent to which government agencies and police departments could monitor the actions of American citizens. Following 9/11, which increased domestic fears of violent jihad and home-grown terrorist plots, the restrictions were eased.[8] In New York City, police officers and city agencies were limited in their powers by the Handschu Consent Decree of 1985. Initially, the Handschu Decree required officers conducting investigations of a political organization to report to the Handschu Authority, comprised of 2 police officers and one non-police affiliated appointed official. The Handschu Authority oversaw all investigations in order to ensure that the organizations were only being investigated as a result of evidence linking the group to a criminal act which had occurred or was threatened to occur.[9] In 2002, New York City appealed to the Federal District Court to remove the Handschu Decree from the investigation process; however, they were unable to prove that it interfered with investigations vital to apprehending those with terrorist motives.[10] As a result, the restrictions placed upon law officers by the Handschu Decree were weakened but not removed. In September 2002, Senior District Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. allowed for modification of the Decree in the vicinity of the FBI guidelines regarding investigations. These guidelines gave officers the right to investigate public meetings and access public information provided they had reason to suspect criminal activity, contrary to previously needed evidence of criminal activity. Furthermore, the new policy removed the relatively independent Handschu Authority, instead allowing investigators to obtain permission from commanding officers within the intelligence department.[11] The police department was not permitted to retain any non-incriminating information.[12] Furthermore, the New York City Police Department’s Demographics Unit created joint investigations with various cities in the surrounding area, including Newark, NJ and Nassau and Suffolk Counties in New York State, thus providing the department with access to a greater amount of information and intelligence collection.
            These changes in the laws regarding privacy and investigation rights following the September 11 attacks allowed the New York City Police Department to rapidly extend its intelligence collection program. While the city did see changes in the policy regarding investigations, many still believe that the NYPD was unjustified in its surveillance of Muslim Americans. Most recently, the American Civil Liberties Union, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and the CLEAR Project have “filed a lawsuit challenging the New York City Police Department's discriminatory surveillance of innocent Muslim New Yorkers.”[13] The plaintiffs of this case are Imam Hamid Hassan Raza, the Masjid Al-Ansar Mosque, Asad (“Ace”) Dandia, Muslims Giving Back Non-Profit, the Masjid At-Taqwa Mosque, and Mohammad Elshinawy.[14]
            When looking at this case from a solely legal standpoint, the question of right-wrong/ guilty-not guilty becomes highly subjective depending on what one would consider to be suspicion of criminal acts. Due to the wording of the modified Handschu Consent Doctrine, the NYPD intelligence committee needs only to prove that they had suspicion of criminal activity. Whether or not the New York Police Department overreached their boundaries, thus, does not become the central question. The central question becomes whether the NYPD had reasonable suspicion to lead to the investigations of a widespread number of innocent American residents and citizens. The New York Police Department explains its action as being necessary in the case that a tip regarding terrorist intent was brought to the attention of the department. In this situation, the officers would have a clear understanding of the culture of the suspect and where this cultural attachment may lead him to stay or organize his plans, as a result of their previous surveillance and knowledge of the neighborhood.[15] Furthermore, the police department argues that the Muslim Student Associations which were surveyed and infiltrated were targeted due to the fundamentalist speakers invited to speak on campus, which prompted concern over radicalism.[16] The problem emerging with this argument is that it assumes all members of a particular faith will act in a certain manner, assuming what many New York Muslims are calling “guilt by association,” arguing that this fear of association infringes upon the First Amendment right of religious freedom. Plaintiffs argue that the locations of concern provide further questioning of the justification of the NYPD investigations. For instance, in New Jersey nearly all the areas of concern were Muslim owned or used.[17] The requirements often only involved groups of similar ethnicities meeting, regardless of whether they were connected to crimes, therefore, giving the appearance of being ethnically and religiously motivated.[18] These two sides of the same action, help to show the subjectivity of the issue and how this subjectivity will hinder the plaintiffs’ attempt to show the New York Police Department did not have any reasonable suspicion to investigate, regardless of whether they actually did or not.
            A further point of legality issues emerges when analyzing the construction of the Demographic Unit. The CIA, which provided the NYPD with assistance in the creation of this intelligence unit, is legally is unable to spy on Americans, thus, furthering the controversy over this program, as it applies foreign spying techniques within the homeland.[19] However, as the CIA was technically not conducting the surveillance on the citizens of New York, the Demographic Unit did not defy jurisdictional boundaries.
            This complex issue has caused must concern over the rights of citizens in contrast to the rights of the governmental agencies. The highly focused surveillance of American Muslims in New York and the surrounding communities has created great controversy, as the New York Police Department faces criticism for allegedly discriminating against all Muslims due to the actions a few. However, when looking though a legal perspective, we see that it is very difficult to prove the New York Police Department was infringing upon American privacy rights due to the vagueness of the requirement of suspicion to justify an investigation.




[1] Hawley, Chris, Adam Goldman, Eileen Sullivan, and Matt Apuzzo. Associated Press. Accessed November 19, 2013. http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/investigation.
[2] Goldman, Adam, and Matt Apuzzo. "NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases." Associated Press. Accessed November 20, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases.
[3] Associated Press. Accessed November 19, 2013. http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_newark.pdf.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hawley, Chris, and Matt Apuzzo. "NYPD Infiltration of Colleges Raises Privacy Fears." Associated Press. Accessed November 20, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-infiltration-of-colleges-raises-privacy-fears.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Goldman, Adam, and Matt Apuzzo. "NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases." Associated Press. Accessed November 20, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases.
[8] Apuzzo, Matt, and Adam Goldman. "With CIA help, NYPD moves covertly in Muslim areas." Associated Press. Accessed November 19, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-in-the-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-covertly-in-Muslim-areas.
[9] New York Civil Liberties Union. "Testimony: Police Surveillance of Political Activity -- The History and Current State of the Handschu Decree." http://www.nyclu.org/content/testimony-police-surveillance-of-political-activity-history-and-current-state-of-handschu-de.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] The New York Times. "Spying on Law-Abiding Muslims." Accessed November 19, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/opinion/sunday/spying-on-law-abiding-muslim-citizens.html?_r=1&
[13] American Civilian Liberties Union. "Raza v. City of New York - Legal Challenge to NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program." Accessed November 19, 2013. https://www.aclu.org/national-security/raza-v-city-new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Goldman, Adam, and Matt Apuzzo. "NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases." Associated Press. Accessed November 20, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases.
[16] Hawley, Chris, and Matt Apuzzo. "NYPD Infiltration of Colleges Raises Privacy Fears." Associated Press. Accessed November 20, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-infiltration-of-colleges-raises-privacy-fears.
[17] Associated Press. Accessed November 19, 2013. http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_newark.pdf.
[18] Goldman, Adam, and Matt Apuzzo. "NYPD: Muslim Spying Led to No Leads, Terror Cases." Associated Press. Accessed November 20, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-Muslim-spying-led-to-no-leads-terror-cases.
[19] Apuzzo, Matt, and Adam Goldman. "With CIA help, NYPD moves covertly in Muslim areas." Associated Press. Accessed November 19, 2013. http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-in-the-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-covertly-in-Muslim-areas.

Broken Windows Theory Worked


Ever since the New York City revival of the mid 1990’s a contentious debate has circled around the topic of the Broken Windows Theory. The premise of the argument is that minor physical or social disorder, if ignored, can lead to a series of crime. In essence, one broken window will send the message that nobody cares and a lack of order exists which leads to more broken windows1.  When the new policing strategy was implemented in 1995 under Mayor Rudy Giuliani and police commissioner William Bratton, crime rates declined dramatically. Although the decline in crime rates lead to a rebirth of America’s largest city, not every one supported this model. Some claimed it caused racial discrimination as a disproportionate amount of minorities were being arrested for what seemed to be petty crimes2. This argument can be disregarded quickly because it is flawed in two ways. First it is making an unfair generalization that arrests are raced based. It is ignoring the fact the minorities tend to live in poor areas, and poor areas are more conducive to crime. Second, to undermine the importance of punishing “petty” crime offenders is dangerous; although, one publicly intoxicated individual may have a minor impact on the city, 10,000 of them could create mass chaos and destroy the city. The major attack against the Broken Windows Theory is aimed at portraying it as a waste of resources because there is a lack of empirical data that proves its effectiveness. These critics do not deny the drop in crime because the statistics are indisputable, however they believe a drop in unemployment, decrease in drug use, and changing demographics were the primary cause of the crime drop3. Although this may be an interesting theoretical debate to have, the critics are incorrect; the decrease in crime during the Giuliani era was so significant that only effective policing and the implementation of the Broken Windows Theory can be credited for the reduction.
The NYC subway system is a fine example of the Broken Window model at work. In the 1980s New Yorkers were steering clear of using the subways. A quarter of a million passengers a day were going over or under turnstiles, young men stalked toll booths waiting for their opportunity to rob hundreds of coins, and the homeless, alcoholics, and drug addicts were sprawled on the seats of cars and on the station platforms. The Transit Police Department finally reacted by proposing massive cleaning crews to hose down the platforms. With support from a special police unit they cleaned the stations and ejected anyone who “interfered” with cleaning. The result was clean and safe subway stations. It was evident that the problem with the subway system was public disorder. TPD officers began to be primarily training their officers in how to handle disorder. The TPD met its fair share of legal battles over it initiatives to combat panhandling but they ultimately came out of court victories. After these steps were taken, series crime began a steep decline.
It is difficult to attribute the marked change in the subway’s environment to anything but the action of the police. Prior to the police action, graffiti was removed, efforts were made to house the homeless, and trains and tracks were upgraded, however, the subway system remained in disarray. When the Broken Windows model was finally applied and violators of “petty crimes” such as being publicly intoxicated, interfering with cleaning, or skipping turnstiles, were punished for their crimes, the subway system experienced a renaissance. In light of this success, the credibility of the other explanations to describe the city’s decrease in crime does not seem so strong. Unemployment was actually increasing during the time of the Subway reform efforts, drug selling was never a major issue in the subway, and there was no evidence of a declining youth population. The subway improvement is a great example of the Broken Windows model because all other variables are being held constant; such variables typically citied by social scientists are controlled4.
            The changes made by the TPD served as a precursor for the changes that would be made a decade later with the NYPD. William Bratton who was chief of the TPD, became police commissioner in 1994 and used this program’s success as a basis for his future actions.  From 1993 through 1997 the number of felony complaints dropped by 44.3 percent, murders and non-negligent homicides dropped by 60.2 percent, forcible rape dropped by 12.4 percent, and robbery dropped by 48 percent5. These are truly incredible statistics for taking place over just a four - year span. It is a far fetch to cite anything but effective policing for these statistics.
A decrease in major crime isn’t the only result of increasing the arrests of petty crime violators.  After the squeegee men, people who stand by traffic and solicit money in return for a windshield wash, were taken off the streets and after prostitutes were taken off the corners, Time Square became an attraction for businesses and tourists alike. Although its impossible to point to empirical data that unequivocally points to either side, it would follow better logic to say that unemployment decreased because criminals were taken off the streets, which invited businesses to open and hire. For those who believe in the contrary, what would cause unemployment to decrease in a crime-ridden area? What businesses would want to open in that type of environment? No rational businessperson will open a business, thus employing local residents, in an area that is dangerous and unwelcoming to customers. Therefore, it is only reasonable to conclude that the drop in unemployment came as a result in a drop in crime, not the other way around.
From 1990-1999 the violent crime rate dropped by more than 56% in New York City compared to 28% nationally6. In the city that started the decade off as one of the most dangerous in the Nation, it ended the decade with a drop in crime that was unprecedented in the history of the country. It is non-sensical to conclude anything but effective policing for this drop in crime. The effective policing in New York City was derived from the Broken Windows Model. The most popular rebuttals of sociological reasons for the decrease in crime have been debunked because of the subway example, which provided a real life scenario in which the Broken Windows model was implemented, with all variables ceteris paribus, and crime decreased. New York City saw a historic drop in crime, only after the Broken Windows Model was implemented; therefore, it would be irresponsible to conclude anything other than that the Broken Windows Model worked.





Bibliography
1.     Kelling, Geroge & Wilson, James. “Broken Windows: The police and
Neighborhood Saftey”.  The Atlantic. March 1982.
2.     Bass, Sandra. “Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control and
Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decesions”. Social
Justice. Vol 28 No. 1. 2001. Print.
3.     Raudenbush, Stephen & Sampson, Robert. “Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of Broken
Windows.” Social Psychology Quarterly 67:319. 2004. Print.
4.     Kelling, Geroge & Bratton William. “ Declining Crime Rates: Insiders
Views Of the New York City Story”. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol 88, No.4. 1998. Print.
5.     Greene, Judith. “Zero Tolerance: A case Study of Police Policies and
Practices in New York City”. Crime and Delinquency 45:171.
1999. Print.
            6.  Hope, Corman & Nanci Mocan. “Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows”.
                                    Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 48. 2005. Print