Broken Windows Theory Worked

Ever since the New York City revival of the mid 1990’s a contentious debate has circled around the topic of the Broken Windows Theory. The premise of the argument is that minor physical or social disorder, if ignored, can lead to a series of crime. In essence, one broken window will send the message that nobody cares and a lack of order exists which leads to more broken windows¹.  When the new policing strategy was implemented in 1995 under Mayor Rudy Giuliani and police commissioner William Bratton, crime rates declined dramatically. Although the decline in crime rates lead to a rebirth of America’s largest city, not every one supported this model. Some claimed it caused racial discrimination as a disproportionate amount of minorities were being arrested for what seemed to be petty crimes². This argument can be disregarded quickly because it is flawed in two ways. First it is making an unfair generalization that arrests are raced based. It is ignoring the fact the minorities tend to live in poor areas, and poor areas are more conducive to crime. Second, to undermine the importance of punishing “petty” crime offenders is dangerous; although, one publicly intoxicated individual may have a minor impact on the city, 10,000 of them could create mass chaos and destroy the city. The major attack against the Broken Windows Theory is aimed at portraying it as a waste of resources because there is a lack of empirical data that proves its effectiveness. These critics do not deny the drop in crime because the statistics are indisputable, however they believe a drop in unemployment, decrease in drug use, and changing demographics were the primary cause of the crime drop³. Although this may be an interesting theoretical debate to have, the critics are incorrect; the decrease in crime during the Giuliani era was so significant that only effective policing and the implementation of the Broken Windows Theory can be credited for the reduction.

The NYC subway system is a fine example of the Broken Window model at work. In the 1980s New Yorkers were steering clear of using the subways. A quarter of a million passengers a day were going over or under turnstiles, young men stalked toll booths waiting for their opportunity to rob hundreds of coins, and the homeless, alcoholics, and drug addicts were sprawled on the seats of cars and on the station platforms. The Transit Police Department finally reacted by proposing massive cleaning crews to hose down the platforms. With support from a special police unit they cleaned the stations and ejected anyone who “interfered” with cleaning. The result was clean and safe subway stations. It was evident that the problem with the subway system was public disorder. TPD officers began to be primarily training their officers in how to handle disorder. The TPD met its fair share of legal battles over it initiatives to combat panhandling but they ultimately came out of court victories. After these steps were taken, series crime began a steep decline.

It is difficult to attribute the marked change in the subway’s environment to anything but the action of the police. Prior to the police action, graffiti was removed, efforts were made to house the homeless, and trains and tracks were upgraded, however, the subway system remained in disarray. When the Broken Windows model was finally applied and violators of “petty crimes” such as being publicly intoxicated, interfering with cleaning, or skipping turnstiles, were punished for their crimes, the subway system experienced a renaissance. In light of this success, the credibility of the other explanations to describe the city’s decrease in crime does not seem so strong. Unemployment was actually increasing during the time of the Subway reform efforts, drug selling was never a major issue in the subway, and there was no evidence of a declining youth population. The subway improvement is a great example of the Broken Windows model because all other variables are being held constant; such variables typically citied by social scientists are controlled⁴.

            The changes made by the TPD served as a precursor for the changes that would be made a decade later with the NYPD. William Bratton who was chief of the TPD, became police commissioner in 1994 and used this program’s success as a basis for his future actions.  From 1993 through 1997 the number of felony complaints dropped by 44.3 percent, murders and non-negligent homicides dropped by 60.2 percent, forcible rape dropped by 12.4 percent, and robbery dropped by 48 percent⁵. These are truly incredible statistics for taking place over just a four - year span. It is a far fetch to cite anything but effective policing for these statistics.

A decrease in major crime isn’t the only result of increasing the arrests of petty crime violators.  After the squeegee men, people who stand by traffic and solicit money in return for a windshield wash, were taken off the streets and after prostitutes were taken off the corners, Time Square became an attraction for businesses and tourists alike. Although its impossible to point to empirical data that unequivocally points to either side, it would follow better logic to say that unemployment decreased because criminals were taken off the streets, which invited businesses to open and hire. For those who believe in the contrary, what would cause unemployment to decrease in a crime-ridden area? What businesses would want to open in that type of environment? No rational businessperson will open a business, thus employing local residents, in an area that is dangerous and unwelcoming to customers. Therefore, it is only reasonable to conclude that the drop in unemployment came as a result in a drop in crime, not the other way around.

From 1990-1999 the violent crime rate dropped by more than 56% in New York City compared to 28% nationally⁶. In the city that started the decade off as one of the most dangerous in the Nation, it ended the decade with a drop in crime that was unprecedented in the history of the country. It is non-sensical to conclude anything but effective policing for this drop in crime. The effective policing in New York City was derived from the Broken Windows Model. The most popular rebuttals of sociological reasons for the decrease in crime have been debunked because of the subway example, which provided a real life scenario in which the Broken Windows model was implemented, with all variables ceteris paribus, and crime decreased. New York City saw a historic drop in crime, only after the Broken Windows Model was implemented; therefore, it would be irresponsible to conclude anything other than that the Broken Windows Model worked.

Bibliography

1.     Kelling, Geroge & Wilson, James. “Broken Windows: The police and

Neighborhood Saftey”.  The Atlantic. March 1982.

2.     Bass, Sandra. “Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control and

Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decesions”. Social

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3.     Raudenbush, Stephen & Sampson, Robert. “Seeing Disorder:

Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of Broken

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4.     Kelling, Geroge & Bratton William. “ Declining Crime Rates: Insiders

Views Of the New York City Story”. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol 88, No.4. 1998. Print.

5.     Greene, Judith. “Zero Tolerance: A case Study of Police Policies and

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            6.  Hope, Corman & Nanci Mocan. “Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows”.

                                    Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 48. 2005. Print