New School Choice Program in DC: Logistics and Normative Analysis

By Rosalba Gleijeses

In the past two weeks, charter schools and the District of Columbia school district announced a new universal enrollment system for students. Under this system, DC students will be able to choose to apply to public and a majority of charter schools through a common lottery system. The lottery’s algorithm matches each student with the best offer suited to his or her choice. DC charter schools were granted autonomy regarding entry into this system. Fourteen have opted out of participating in this new program. The objective of the program is to increase transparency and choice for 20,000 students currently on the waitlist for charter schools. The program caters to all levels of education ranging from early childhood to high school. Each student is allowed to rank up to twelve schools. If a student does not receive his or her first choice, the student will automatically be waitlisted for a school that her or she ranked high. The system sounds promising, but there are many important factors to consider in evaluating the potential success of this new school choice policy: the nature, scope, and characteristics of education owed by the state, the distribution of authority in the education system, economic efficiency of school choice, and the regulations that should be imposed on such policies.

In discussing the kind of education that is owed, it is important to evaluate it as a service that serves both to benefit individuals and as a public good. Education functions obviously as an individual good, insofar as each student benefits from what he/she learns in school. Education functions as a public good insofar as it enables a generation to perform their future jobs better. A high functioning, efficient job market is one component of a successful society. The education that is owed should take both forms. The second necessarily follows from the first.

The education owed should be sufficient in preparing students to enter society as active participants in the job market. Many would argue that K-12 is the necessary minimum for achieving this goal. However, there has been a trend towards further educational funding, as seen through state universities. In evaluating education as a public good, one can conceive of social benefits of a college-educated society. The primary benefits of college education, however, are more significantly realized by the individual.

The paramount characteristic of the education owed is fostering of academic achievement. This manifests in sufficient quantitative and verbal instruction, and test scores. Another defining characteristic is the economic efficiency and equity of the system. The promotion of civil values, while not the primary objective of the education system, is a favorable characteristic. Finally, the nature education owed should be characterized by a physically and emotionally environment.

 In establishing the obligation to provide education to all children, it necessarily to further establish the level of funding owed to various beneficiaries. The paramount group that must be addressed is the general population. In referring back to Rawls’ social contract theory, the original position entails development of a policy from which even the worst off benefit. Hence, in deciding how much funding is owed to the general population for education, the amount must be sufficient to fund enough schools to cater to the needs of all students, even those of the lowest socioeconomic status. Should more be owed to “gifted and talented” students? It depends on whether of needs of the least endowed (monetarily, academically, artistically, etc.) are being met. If auxiliary funds were available, devoting them to means by which foster particular aptitudes in children would certainly be beneficial. School choice overwhelmingly seems to be leading society closer towards meeting its moral obligations to provide education. With the implementation of several structural changes, many of which are realized in the more personalized algorithm of DC’s new lottery system, these obligations can be more successfully met. The moral obligation to provide education rests in the Rawls’s principles of justice. Under the original position, these principles would entail that: (i) everyone have equal liberties, so long as they are compatible with the liberties of others, and (ii) permissible social and economic inequalities can exist only if such inequalities are in the interest of the least well off.

Authority over education is necessarily shared by its various kinds of contributors, notably: the state, the school district, and the parents. The distribution of such authority is contentious, particularly when applied to curriculum requirements and integration. States and districts could have the authority to implement quotas, lottery systems, or vouchers as a means of further integrating schools. DC’s new school choice program is rare insofar as it grants greater autonomy and authority to charter schools than do programs in other cities, such as New Orleans and Denver. Compelling arguments for school choice indicate that parents should largely have the authority in choosing where there kids will be educated. In terms of curriculum, authority should fall on the districts. Minimum curriculum should include comprehensive verbal and quantitative skill programs. The stratified socioeconomic levels, amongst many other influential factors, present in every state necessitate widely varying aptitudes and achievement potential amongst students. Districts can address these differences more specifically than could states.

 Some argue that society’s obligation is limited to the funding of educational, and does not extend to the delivery of its services. An argument for the systematic privatization of schools can be linked to Milton Friedman’s proposal of school vouchers. He believes that private providers would offer more efficient, adaptable, and innovative means of delivery educational services. He concedes that privatized financing alone would be insufficient, and should be supplemented by necessary public funding. Supporters of this view maintain that the delivery and funding aspects of the system should operate autonomously. Charter schools, while publically funded, garner significant private donations, often making them more accommodating than frequently underfunded public schools.

The economic justification for this is that market providers should be responsible for delivery as a means of reaping the benefits of completion. The market model is illustrative in understanding this argument. From the market model, it can be deduced that competition leads to more efficiency. Julian Betts demonstrates the inconsistencies of applying the model of perfect competition to the education system, but offers policy solutions as to how to address these concerns and avoid a monopolistic structure. It would be increasingly difficult for to garner extra funding, as more successful schools enter the market, hence lowering the equilibrium price of schools.

Charter schools, are emerging with increased frequency, especially in the District of Columbia, as publically funded schools that exist outside, and hence exempt from, the restrictions of the public school system. Charter schools require sufficient funding from their respective districts. Federal programs offering tax credits to charter school investors, such as New Markets Tax Credits, are another option to supplement district funding. Charter schools are supposed to receive at least as much per pupil funding as private schools. If this were to increase, then more charter schools could afford to fund important services such as transportation.

While DC is working to maximize the benefits of school choice in the context of its many charter schools, it should be noted that school choice need not go unchecked. The benefits of school choice policy projected by its proponents would not necessarily be lost with some degree of regulation. Three salient benefits are often noted: (i) schools will operate more efficiently as a result of market competition, (ii) increased choices offer opportunities that lower income families did not previously have, and (iii) decentralization of education providers will be more effective in addressing diverse student needs that would be the public school system. While need-based voucher programs have been shown to minimize economic and racial stratification, public vouchers and lottery systems, such as the new policy enacted in DC, are means of achieving these benefits.

            All things considered, DC’s new school choice policy looks promising. Expanding the number of choices available to families would further benefit the system. However, supplemental policy changes could be made to further the effectiveness of DC’s education system. One such change involves increasing the scope and accessibility of information available to parents of all socioeconomic levels. More informed choices could only benefit the quality of education provided to students. Barriers such as high start up costs and extensive bureaucratic procedures inhibit this. To ameliorate this problem, failed schools could lease their buildings to new education providers. Large schools could divide into smaller schools: sharing the costs of facilities, transportation, food, etc., while still promoting competition. Reducing necessary government paper work for opening schools would render similar results. Such adjustments, in addition to the perceived benefits of DC’s new universal enrollment program, could further the success of both the charter schools and public schools in the district.

Bibliography

Katie Ash, “D.C. Enrollment Plan Includes Common Form for Charters, Traditional Schools,” Education Week. Charters & Choice, 21 November 2013. Web. 25 November 2013.

Julian R. Betts, “The Economic Theory of School Choice,” in Getting Choice Right, ed. Julian R. Betts and Tom Loveless, 14-39. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2005.

Julian R. Betts, Dan Goldhaber, and Larry Rosenstock, “The Supply Side of School Choice,” in Getting Choice Right, ed. Julian R. Betts and Tom Loveless, 61-84. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2005.

Jeffery R. Henig, “Understanding the Political Conflict over School Choice,” in Getting Choice Right, ed. Julian R. Betts and Tom Loveless, 176-209. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2005.